Human Rights in China

Deakin University’s Professor Baogang He recently delivered a landmark presentation on Human Rights in China and particularly how they should be viewed in Australia.

This is an edited text of that presentation.

There are three issues that emerge when considering this topic. The first relates to the impact of the rise of China on human rights. The second relates to the vast difference between elite and popular assessments of human rights. And the third questions the appropriate framework for developing a sophisticated and complex understanding of China’s human rights. I will present my preliminary answers in response to these three questions. In particular, I propose a notion of the mixed regime of human rights in China so as to develop an intellectual inquiry into and a sophisticated understanding of the complexity of human rights in China.

Does the rise of China undermine the global human rights regime?

The rise of China has impacted global human rights issues in a variety of ways. The success of Chinese economic development offers an alternative development model for developing countries, which stresses the role of government and de-emphasizes civil and political rights. Qin Hui, Professor from Qinghua University, argues that China's economic development benefited from low human rights standards. In particular, he points to migrant workers to support his claim. Many developing countries have showed their great interest in the Chinese model.

In ‘Rogue Aid,’ Naim asserts that an expanding China is likely to undermine human rights everywhere, particularly in the developing world by promoting its own development alternative which does not emphasize human rights¹. Elliot argues that China’s economic achievements and policies have propped up human-rights abusers in some African countries². Kharas, however, notices that China’s success is helping most developing countries, and has lifted 300 million people out of poverty³.

The economic rise of China has also had an influence on China’s internal democratisation and human rights situation. It can be seen that the rise of China is deflecting international criticism of China’s human rights record, which Sullivan identifies as “dismal”⁴. Minxin Pei concurs on this, as he argues that the rise of China is producing “an increasingly dangerous mix of crony capitalism, rampant corruption and widening inequality,” and has a significantly brutal impact on the internal situation of China, stagnating political reforms and resisting democratisation⁵. J. Oi, on the other hand, observes that the economic rise of China has resulted in positive improvements in human rights in China as the Communist party has allowed some freedoms and granted some rights to citizens in order to maintain stability and sustain its exponential growth.⁶ It is reasonable to suggest that the rise of China is likely to strengthen the cause for global human rights. This is largely because the current leadership in China is willing to join the international community in supporting the principle of human rights, albeit in theory. More importantly, human rights offers safeguards which help ensure the sustainability of China’s rise. Nevertheless, the rise of China poses a challenge to the global human rights regime. Without the participation of China, the formation of an Asia-Pacific human rights organisation remains unlikely.

How do we explain the gap between elite and popular assessment of human rights?

The elite assessment of global human rights is vastly different from that of the popular assessment of human rights. In China for instance, the World Value Survey reveals that many Chinese believe that there are modest considerations for individual human rights. The Chinese popular assessment grade is ahead that of many countries including the USA, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil, Iran, and many others.

By comparison, the elite assessment score of human rights in China is quite low. Take for example the Freedom of House, which ranked China as “not free”. This is based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing the most-free and 7 representing the least free. From 1972 to 1977, China was ranked as 7 for political rights and civic liberties. Between 1978 and 1988, with the beginning of China’s economic reforms, China was given a ranking of 6 for political rights and civil liberties. After the Tiananmen Event in 1989, both the scores went back to 7 (1989-1997). Between 1998-2008, the score of political rights was 7, while civil liberties were ranked as 6. In short, the Freedom of House results reveal that China’s human right record has remained relatively unchanged from its status almost 35 years ago. This is despite great political, economic and social change, including village elections, intra-party elections, and the development of deliberative institutions that have taken place in China.

A few years ago in New York, I discussed with researchers at Freedom of House about the score system and associated methodology in terms of assessing China’s complex human rights. Freedom of House has now developed a new category that examines countries at crossroads. This is based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance. In the case of China, the score for accountability and public voice was 1.08 in 2005, and increased to 1.17 in 2007. For civil liberties the score was 1.61 in 2005 and 2.14 in 2007. For the rule of law it was 1.76 in 2005 and 2.23 in 2007.8 And for anticorruption and transparency China scored 2.18 in 2005 and 2.49 in 2007. This adjusted assessment supplies us with a better comprehension of China’s political development. The difference between the elite and popular evaluation is largely in respect of their normal affairs. This difference can be explained by a number of factors in the Chinese context. First, official propaganda in China is such that people are made to believe that their human rights' record is better than reality. Second, problems with methodological measurements or biased assessment by elites are also contributing factors. For example, the small change in the Freedom of House score is merely a reflection of major political events such as the reform process in 1978 and the Tiananmen event in 1989.

Third, the social survey in China does not provide an accurate assessment of the human rights situation in China. While the above explanations are partially true, I would like to suggest that China has indeed improved its human rights record in the last 30 years, which will be discussed in the next section.

Is the idea of the mixed regime of human rights appropriate in describing the complexity of human rights in China?

The conventional conceptualisation of human rights separates political and civic rights from economic and social rights. It is often claimed that China is weak in protecting civil and political rights but relatively strong in respecting and protecting social and economic rights. While such an intellectual categorization is still useful today, I would like to make another important conceptual distinction between individualized rights and collective rights. While the former are increasingly protected, the latter are still suppressed in China. I would like to now discuss the idea of a mixed regime of human rights which forms a new concept in understanding China’s human rights situation. This concept can be likened to the Chinese soup in which different ingredients are mixed, and a chef decides different proportions of different ingredients at different times for different tastes. China has developed a mixed regime of human rights. First, while Chinese officials initially denied human rights discourse in the early 1970-1980s, there is now an increased recognition of principles of human rights. This is demonstrated by China’s support for the two international human rights conventions in the 1990s. Second, every three years villagers now cast their votes at village elections. They have the right to consent when their village land is appropriated by local government, that is, they must sign the agreement document. They also have a right to sue local governments for the violation of their rights. In most cases villagers have won the legal cases.

It should be emphasized that the protected rights are individualised. The Chinese government protects rights relating to individual interests. It also provides and protects limited rights and democratic procedures that deal with conflicts of individual interests. Increasingly, personal freedom is being used as an instrument for greater social control. While personal freedom is protected to satisfy one’s pleasure, it must also be controlled so that it does not challenge the CCP’s political authority. Although political and civil rights, such as the right to express a preference in public policy, are protected, they continue to improve governance only. Collective rights are monopolised by the state. As a result, all rights which potentially challenge the authority of the government are suppressed. For instance, workers are not permitted to exercise the right to organise themselves. Instead, the official trade union is responsible for defending the rights and interests of the workers. This policy was installed by the CCP in response to workers’ demands. This mixed regime of human rights is basically Hobbesian world order, which allows individuals to enjoy certain rights while sacrificing others for personal safety. Under this system in China, authoritarian leaders using the power of the public security bureau, exercise political control to create a sense of fear. At the same time, local governments in China frequently hold public meetings to consult with citizens about local public policies, involving people in the local decision making process. This forms a unique combination of coercive state power mixed with consultative and communicative power.

China receives a low ranking in the physical integrity rights index. It is clear that political imprisonment and the arrest of political dissidents are contributing factors to this low scale. Nevertheless, in 2004, the total number of deliberative and consultative meetings at village level was estimated at 453,000. This is higher than the total number of social protests in China (75,000/year), and significantly greater than the number of political dissidents who were arrested. The growing number of these deliberative and participatory meetings partially explains why the CCP is capable of maintaining power and social order in China. Some of these practices meet the following three criteria: formation of public judgment, transmission, accountability (Fung 2008) and even the ideal of deliberative democracy (Fishkin, etc. 2009). Some practices empower citizens, granting the right to equal concern, the right to express one’s voice, the right to consent, the right to initiate a meeting, and even the right to organise an agenda. In this mixed regime of human rights, the political aims are mixed ones and include stability, efficiency, legitimacy, democracy and control. In theory, democracy relies on the most consent and the least coercion and China's authoritarianism depends on the most coercion and the least consent; in practice, both coercion and consent are employed and combined in different ways. Democracy is employed to strengthen the Party's domination through elections, deliberation, and the rule of law. In short, Chinese authoritarianism is mixed with limited democratic elements; and this mix is colored by the Confucian idea of the middle way. The mixed regime can be seen as a complex social control mechanism, a strategy of balancing democracy and authority, and a special political form of government. The idea of the mixed regime describes a complex system with a greater degree of reality so as to avoid simplistic judgment. This idea can assist appreciation of China’s complex political system and provides a theoretical framework enabling us to grasp the changed and changing nature of China’s regime.

Today, Chinese leaders have a desire to strike a balance between authority and liberty, and seek effective ways to cope with the complexity of modernity and maintaining stability. It seems that neither totalitarianism, nor authoritarianism, and nor democracy alone can offer a desirable solution to the complex problems China faces. This must be found by combining the best of each in a mixed regime. The resulting mix is not a static matter of checks and balances, but a dynamic blending of three elements that are needed in different proportions at different times.

In order to promote human rights and democracy in China, we should first develop a comprehensive, adequate and updated understanding of the human rights and democratic situation in a rapidly changing China. At the moment, Australia’s understanding is lagging far behind the fast transformation of China; and the narrow and inadequate understanding prevents us from understanding the complexity of the human right and democracy record in China. We should recognise, appreciate and encourage the recent consultative and deliberative institutions and forums in China, which empower individuals with a set of rights such as the right to consent, the right to be consulted, the right to equal concern in public, the right to access to information, the right to initiate a meeting and make motions, and the right to participate in decision-making process. These consultative and deliberative institutions and forums should be a new area of the Australia-China Human Rights Technical Cooperation Program or AusAid program, and offer new strategies of deliberative democratisation for the international democracy-promotion community.

Endnotes

1. M. Naim, ‘Rogue Aid’ Foreign Policy, March/April, 2007, pp.95-96.
2. M. Elliot, ‘The Chinese Century’, Time Magazine, 11/1/2007.
3. H. Kharas, ‘Lifting all boats’ Foreign Policy, January/February, 2005, pp. 54-5.
4. M. Sullivan, ‘Developmentalism and China’s Human Rights Policy,’ in Van Nes, P eds. Debating Human Rights: Critical Essays from the United States and Asia, London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 120-143.
5. Minxin Pei, ‘The Dark Side of China’s Rise’ Foreign Policy, March/April issue, 2006, p. 23.
6. J. Oi, ‘Realms of Freedom in Post-Mao China,’ in W. Kirby, ed.. Realms of Freedom in Modern China, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 265-284.

To find out more about Professor He and his work:
http://www.deakin.edu.au/~baogang/

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